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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BENJAMIN BOONE NEAL,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 45372
Twin Falls County Case No.
CR-42-2016-9994

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Neal failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by imposing
a unified sentence of 10 years, with three years fixed, upon his guilty plea to felony DUI, or by
denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence?

Neal Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Neal pled guilty to felony DUI (prior felony DUI conviction within 15 years) and the
district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.177-81.)
Neal filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.189-92.) He also
filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (I.C.R.
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Rule 35 Motion to Reduce Sentence, Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence
I.C.R. Rule 35 (Augmentation).)
Neal asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence
in light of his amenability to treatment, prior successful performance on probation, community
support, and purported acceptance of responsibility. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-8.) Neal has failed
to establish an abuse of discretion.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
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prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The maximum prison sentence for felony DUI (prior felony DUI conviction within 15
years) is 10 years. I.C. §§ 18-8005(6), -8005(9). The district court imposed a unified sentence
of 10 years, with three years fixed, which falls within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.177-81.)
Neal’s sentence is also reasonable in light of his ongoing decisions to endanger others by driving
while intoxicated and his failure to rehabilitate while in the community.
Neal’s criminal record demonstrates his disregard for the law and his inability or
unwillingness to abstain from driving while intoxicated. Neal has two prior misdemeanor DUI
convictions and one prior felony DUI conviction. (PSI, pp.5-6.) In this case, Neal drove while
intoxicated, ran a stop sign, and collided with another vehicle. (PSI, pp.3-5.) When a police
officer arrived on the scene he “immediately noticed a very strong odor of an alcoholic
beverage,” and also observed that “Neal’s eyes were glassy and his speech was slow and
slurred.” (PSI, p.4.) Contrary to Neal’s assertion that he accepted responsibility for the offense,
Neal refused to take a breathalyzer test and refused consent for a blood draw. (PSI, p.4.) Officer
Caldwell nevertheless obtained a warrant for a blood draw, the results of which showed Neal’s
blood alcohol level was .224. (PSI, pp.4, 37.) Neal previously completed outpatient treatment in
2008, but started drinking again two years later. (PSI, pp.10-11.) Neal stated that he stayed
sober while on probation, but slowly started drinking again once he was no longer being
supervised. (PSI, p.10.) Prior treatment and supervision have not kept Neal from continuing to
drink and get behind the wheel of a car. While Neal does have community support, it does not
outweigh the seriousness of the offense.
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At sentencing, the district articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its
decision and also addressed the seriousness of the offense, Neal’s ongoing DUI offending, the
great risk he poses to society, and his failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite prior treatment
opportunities and legal sanctions. (10/15/17 Tr., p.25, L.5 – p.33, L.17.) The state submits that
Neal has failed to establish that his sentence is excessive for reasons more fully set forth in the
attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on
appeal. (Appendix A.)
Neal next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence in light of a letter he submitted documenting his rehabilitative
efforts while incarcerated and requesting a period of retained jurisdiction, a letter from his
former employer, and his claim that the district court “misunderstood” the state’s sentencing
recommendation and imposed a more excessive sentence than intended. (Appellant’s brief, pp.811.) If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under
Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on
appeal, Neal must “show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id. Neal has failed
to satisfy his burden.
The information contained in Neal’s letter and the letter of support from his former
employer was not information that entitled Neal to a reduction of sentence. While Neal’s
rehabilitative efforts while incarcerated and his desire for treatment are laudable, they do not
address, much less outweigh, the seriousness of the offense, the danger Neal presents to the
community, and his prior failures to rehabilitate while in the community. In denying Neal’s Rule
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35 motion, the district court specifically found that Neal “provided no new information
convincing the Court that the sentence should be reduced.”

(Order Denying Motion for

Reconsideration of Sentence, p.14 (Augmentation).) Additionally, contrary to Neal’s assertions
below and on appeal that the district court appeared to have misunderstood the state’s sentencing
recommendation was for a rider, the district court specifically considered that recommendation
but rejected it, stating:
I cannot follow the recommendation of a retained jurisdiction. I cannot. I cannot
put you in problem-solving court… … And when you look at this, when you take
a step back and look at it, this second felony DUI where the DUI results in an
accident with an innocent victim, is that a probation case? The answer is no. Is
that a retained jurisdiction case? The answer is no.
(10/15/17 Tr., p.31, Ls.2-22.) The district court also stated in its order denying Neal’s Rule 35
that, “The Court considered the criteria for placing Defendant on probation or imposing
imprisonment.” (Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence, p.14 (Augmentation).)
Neal has not shown that he was entitled to a reduction of sentence simply because he is
employable or because of his positive performance while incarcerated. Neal has also failed to
show that the district court “misunderstood” the state’s sentencing recommendation. Given any
reasonable view of the facts, Neal has failed to establish that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Neal’s conviction and sentence and
the district court’s order denying Neal’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

DATED this 8th day of March, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 8th day of March, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
LARA E. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

1 starting. That's where I 'm used to starting.
2
If we don't utilize this problem-solving court

oniPM

02c2lPM

02:23PM

0>!23PM

02'2lP1,1

3

and give the court all of those punishment elements that it

4

needs to follow up and make It effective, we are backing

1 anything, I just ask that I am able to continue with my
2 t reatment and recovery so t hat I can stay and support my
3 wife.
4
That's all, Your Honor.
5
THE COURT: Well, the primary goal of sentencing
6 is protection of society. There are related goals of

5 this Individual up, and that is not effective.
tQ:2:.'M
6
What I have attempted to do here, Your Honor, Is
7 not to plea for leniency, because I want this problem
7
8 solved, Boone wants this problem solved, and that will
8
9 protect the community. We have a path forward. It makes
9
10 sense. We have the resources, and it will be more
02,,.,... 10
11 effective than a rider.
11
12
And so therefore we ask that t he court follow - 12
13 I'm not making this up. These aren't just arguments.
13
14 These are the tools provided to the court to make Its
14
15 decision and It's all that the court has. Otherwise it's
02,_ 15
16 Just making an educated guess. Maybe that's what sentences
16
17

are. But I th ink that t he court would be better served,

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

the community would be better served, of course, to rely on
the professional opinions In the GAIN survey and by these
counseling individuals.

18
19
,.,,.... 20

It says It's pending •• his acceptance into Vet court is
pending. He actually has been to Vet court. He has
participated in Vet court. And Mr. Conger expressed to me
'2.17PM

sentence requires consideration of the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and protection of
the public interest. The nature of the offense and
protection of the public interest are related. The
required . And the publi c Interest is not only in being
safe from future crimes, but in seeing punishment imposed
for crimes committed.
That plays a role In this type of case. A big
one. And I 'm familiar wit h the sentencing goals In Idaho
Code 19-2521 t hat says probation is appropriate unless an
imposed sentence is appropriate because of various factors.

21 And most of those factors are present here.
22
First Is t here an undue risk that you will commit
23 a crime while on probation. And it's clear it Is. And In
24 spite of your successful completion of probation before,
25 there's a risk. A big risk given what happened.

was because the sentence hasn't been issued yet. So
there's problem -- no problem him getting into this

3

problem-solving court.

17

02'2SPM

25

2
4
02'2APM
5
6
7
8
9
on, PM 10
11
12
13
14
.,,,••,.. 15
16

And frankly, Your Honor, we're not taking any of
the penalty tools off the table . All we're saying Is let's

OZ-27PM

1
2
3
4
5

alcohol problem it's a little bit different than some other
sentencing factors. And here having two prior DUis and

A factor is whether you need correctional

t reat ment most effectively provided by imposing a sentence.
And that factor Is unclear here because I think that goes
more to rehabilitation and what you need. Just from an

keep heading In the right direction. Let's keep heading

6

down the path that is effective because that will best

7

then a third DUI which was a felony, you're supposed to

serve everyone.

8

understand by then that the reason not to drive under the

9

influence is because it's dangerous.

THE COURT: Anything you wish to say on your own
behalf, Mr. Neal?

02".28PM

MR. NEAL: Yes, Your Honor. I would like to
formally apologize to Mrs. Remaley. I'm really, really
sorry and I'm sorry for your loss. My decisions put her
and the community in serious danger. I fully understood my
add iction to alcohol and all the negative impacts it's

02'211PM

brought. I'm committed with all my heart to a sober life.
I've entered Into treatment programs and counseling. The

18 support I get from my wife and my family and counselors is
19 helping me become t he man I wa nt to be.
20
Maving the love of my wife has given me the
21 direction and the drive that I haven't had in a long time.
22 Her safety and happiness and building a fami ly and future
23 is the most important t hing to me and alcohol is no part of
24 that future. I will never again be a danger to this or any

°'"""" 25

L

severity of the crime corresponds to the protection

23

1

community . I know I'm not In a position to ask for

10
So whatever was done before did not deter the
11 conduct. And this Is where we start looking at the
12 difference between add iction and DUls because, I 'm not
13 sorry to say, it's Just a fact. The law is indifferent to
14 whether you're an alcoholic. You can sit at home and drink
15 a half gallon of liquor a day until your liver melts and
16 the law does not care. It's not the right thing to do, but
17 you're not violating a law until you get beh ind the wheel.
18 Then it's a problem for the community and becomes not just
19 an addiction problem. It's not just addiction, it 's

"'"'"""' 20
21
22
23
24
02'20PM 25

conduct committed while you're Intoxicated.
So a sentencing factor here that is greatly
important here -- and I'll say more on this -· but it's
tragic, too, a lesser sanction than an imposed sentence
depreciates the seriousness of the crime. And is
imprisonment an appropriate punishment and deterrent to

24

10/15/2017 09:25:08 AM

,-

rehabilitation and retribution. 'The reasonableness of a

17

And I should say, I have talked to Mr. Conger and

that he is approved, but I'm assuming why it was pending

deterrence, which Is two types, specific and general,

26
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02:2SPM

1
2
3
4
5
6

02:29PM

02:30PM

you? Yes. And is it an appropriate deterrent to other
persons? Yes.
And DUI laws show It's an area where general
deterrence can work, alt hough It's not the major factor.
It's a minor factor here, but It 's a factor that ties In

02:lOPM

to get behind a wheel? And what was d one before didn't
prevent It.
You do have remorse. I think you r remorse Is
sincere. That's a mitigating factor. I think starting
recovery and doing everything you can to address the
problem is a mitigating factor. I think you have an

7

And the question Is whether you're a multiple

7

ability to comply with probation terms at some level. The

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

offender or professional criminal. This goes to some of

8

problem Is you had that before and you did It and then that

the tragedy of the case: You are a multiple offender by
definition, but your only crime Is DUI -- but essentially

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

02:33PM

there's the misdemeanor, I think, Possession of a
Controlled Substance and then the driver's license case.
I mean, that' s not typical In felony DU I cases
where you don't see an array of all kinds of criminal
offenses. You see Issues, perhaps a few, of substance

02:33PM

abuse, and then driving under the influence.

17

02:30PM

0'2:32PM

with protection of lhe public interest.

1
2
3
4
5
6

17

But the problem Is by the time you get one felony
DUI you are a multiple offender by definition, and now
you've got two. And the conseq uences are horr ible, and
that' s where we discuss risk, because does it pose a risk

02:J<PM

to society? Yes. And It did here. Your luck ran out.
And every time you drive drunk something like that could
happen. And usually it doesn' t. Well, h ere it did. So
who should bear that risk? The answer Is, both the law and
logic tells us you should bear at that risk.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

02:J• PM

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

wasn't enough to keep you from driving again.
Now, the add iction part of the relapse, well,
okay. But you had to know, you'd been through the felony
DUI process, you may not want to do that again if you've
relapsed or you know you have an addiction to alcohol.
The nature of the harm caused was substantial In
terms of the accident. And it's fortunate It wasn't a
vehicular mansla ughter. I don't want to minimize the harm.
Worse and more tragic cases have come into the district
courts, but this Is a way worse second felony DUI than most
because

or the

accident, where you total somebody' s car and

you've got 25,000 restitution. That's not the average even
second felony DUI by any stretch of the imagination. This
IS a much more aggravated case because of the accident.
The unpleasantness of these cases Is that you're
not an evll person. You don't wa nt to go out and hurt
anybody. You don't take any Joy In going out and crashing

27

0":?31PIA

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

02:31PM

0~32PM

O:>:J2PM

O:tJ2•M

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

29

into people in your car. But the problem Is you did, and

about It. You didn't take any j oy from causing harm. No.

1
2
3
4
5
6

But you had to know that your conduct th reatened h arm and

7

DU!s they were a while ago and you started treatment, and

could cause harm given you r record .

8

maybe.

Other sentencing factors: Did your conduct cause
or threaten harm. Obviously It did. I t caused harm here.
Whether you contemplated your conduct would cause
or th reaten harm. You certainly didn't Intend this. I
think it's clear you did not Intend this. You're not happy

0?;3,SPM

A factor to consider is whether you have a
criminal history or have led a law-abiding life for a

02:>IPM

substantial time. You have a cr iminal history, but you
have been able to comply with the law for periods of t ime.
That's a mitigating factor to some extent. But the problem
Is the re offense for the same thing you got off felony
probation for and then there's the tragic resu lt -- or the

02:35PM

severe result.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

you've had a record for this.
I f it were a first felony DUI with an accident,
that would be bad enough. You could start looking at
problem-solving courts, perhaps a reta ined j urisdiction and
you can say, You know, there's hope here. You had some

But on a second felony to DUI where there's an
accident -- her e's the blu nt part about sentencing, and
It' s not really an enunciated factor in 19 -2521, but It's
th e straight-face test to sentencing: Can you look at a
victim and with a straight face say on a second felony DUI
with an accident we j ust do straight probation. You can't
say that. And you ca n't say It with a rider either. And
with a straight face can you look at the next victi m who's

17

But there's no provocation. There are no

17

in a wheelchair or in the morgue or their relatives sitting

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the

18
19
20

straight probation when he had an accident? Can you look

Influence. And the victi m In th is case did nothing to

21

was ap propriate if we just put you on probation? The

induce or facilitate it.

22
23
24

a nswer Is no.

25

cau sed an accident, fortunately no one is killed, and what

offense, Including addiction, beca use addiction Is not a
defense to getting beh ind the wh eel when you'r e under the

<Yl:J<PM

Whether your conduct was the result of
circumstances unlikely to recur. Here there's a huge risk:

If you get stressed out and decide to relapse are you going

02:36PM

there saying , You let a guy with a second felony DUI out on

at that victim w ith a straight face and say the sentence

And it's tragic. It' s just tragic because your
one cri minal problem is DUIS. You've had multiples, you

28
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1

2
3

02:-

02:37PM

I think one of the goals of sentencing is not to
impose a greater sentence than the m inimum required and

4
5
6

that's why I've only given you three years fixed. I

The purposes of sentencing are more than just

7

think with the m itigat ing factors and the fact that you do

8

what might work best for you on rehabilitation. Tha t' s a

8

h ave genuine r emor se and some fami ly support, I th ink

9

factor, and an Important one In many cases, but you get to

9
10
11
12
13
14

you'll get parole, but th e seven years hanging over your

j urisdiction . I cannot. I cannot put you in

4

problem- solving court. And I think what I said about the

5

straight-face test goes to depreciating the ser ious nature

6

of the crime.

O'J:J40PM

thought about mor e: Four years as the state recommends,
five years, higher. I've thought about those options. I

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

the point on some cases where you cause har m and a

15

it will be pu re punishment in some r espects, but I think it

and the sentencing factors •• to depreciate the serious

16

have a deterrent effect on you and accomplishes the goals

17

nature of the crime.

17

of sentencing.

18
19

appeal discuss It with counsel and he can perfect that for

20

you . You'll be remanded to the custody of the DOC.

18
19
.,,,,,..... 20

02,:l&PM

interlock thereafter.

2

I cannot follow the recommendation of a retained

3

7

02:37PM

1

do we do about it . And the answer to that is prison.

21
22
23
24
25

. .:4CPM

substantial r isk to society where we can no longer look at
you and Just your needs and everything else first.
We have to look at protection or society, we h ave
t o look at pr ot ection o f the public interest, we have to
refuse, In my view, under the law •• this is under the law

02:4 1PM

And when you look at this, when you take a step
back and look at it, this second felony DUI where t he DUI
results in an accident with an innocent victim, is t hat a
probation case? The answer Is no. I s that a retained
jurisdiction case? The answer is no.
The question is how much time. And at first
glance you could Justify an all-fixed sentence beca use I
think it may be a question of warehousin g. I think you

02:4 1PM

head , plus a license suspension, may well be enough to
protect the community.
But to do less, to do any less, In my view, would
depreciate the serious nature of the crime, would endanger
the public, and would not p rotect the public Interest. And

You have 42 days to appeal. If you wish to

21
22
23
24
25

31

could Justify a range of sentences. More perhaps than what

2

the state is recommending.

3

.."''""

33

1

But on the other hand I think some of the

RE PORTER ' S CERT IF I CATE

4

m itigating factors are present and I think you have the

5

sense and the family support and all those mitigating

6

factors that parole may work, and parole may keep you on

7

the straight and nar row and you may finally recognize how

8

serious this Is. Because If you go out and comm it a

9

.."'"' 10
11
12
13
14
02:...., 15
16
17

18
19
°''""'" 20
21
22
23
24
......,.. 25

STA'H~

or

COUtlTY

vehicular manslaug hter when you're out, you' re looking at

or

TOAHO

M?NIOOKA

I , MAURE:E:N !'lEWT¢N , O! t !cia.l Court: Report:er .and

life. You're looking at a persiste nt v iolator or you're

Notary PUblic, in and tor the Fifth Judi eial Dist rict o t

looking at the maximum fixed . And you can never ma ke it

10

Mtn ldoka Councy , I daho , do hereby certity t:hat t.he above

r ight for the next victim. You can never go back In time

11

and roregulng c ypevritt eu pages cor1t:ain a Lr'\ut ..uW:I t:orr11tt;t

if th at happens.

12

transcription of my shocthand notes taken upon the oec~~lon

So you 'r e going to get out some day. I can't

13
11

give you life. And we have to balance some r isk, as

co"'J)Utcc- .:1idcd tr.an:icr:ipcion by ICC or under 1111y dtrect.1on.

..
15

counsel is saying. So based on the mitigating factors I've
thought about a greater sentence, but I wll l give you •• I

I?

will sentence you as follows: A unified sentence of ten

10

years, comprising three yea rs fixed, seven years

19

indeterminate. It's imposed. Court costs, cred it for time

20

Witr\033 my hand , this the H t h day

ot

October,

2011 .

-·----------- - --

served ten days. You must pr ovide a DNA sample and a right
thumb print. I will not in the exercise of discretion

22

MAURteN HCWTON , CS!\ .321

23

Co\irt Reporter J1nct Notary Publi.e

order restitution for that. Order r estitution In the

fen thu Sta t.~ o( hJ.1ho

amount of 25,898 .48. Driving privilege suspension five

My COO\ll'lission expires 9 - 10- 2018

years beginning on release and then two years of Ignition

32
l0/15/20 17 09: 25:08 AM
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